# **VLDB: Privacy and Security**

A Comparative Evaluation of Order-Revealing Encryption Schemes and Secure Range-Query Protocols by **Dmytro Bogatov**, George Kollios and Leonid Reyzin [BKR19] (PVLDB 2019)

Dmytro Bogatov dmytro@dbogatov.org Built from 71921593 on June 6, 2020

Boston University

### Secure Range Queries

#### The problem

- Many different solutions
- Understanding performance / security tradeoff
- · Heterogeneous security definitions and leakage profiles
- · Performance not well-understood
  - · Some constructions were not even implemented
  - Most constructions have at most prototype implementation
  - Most of them were not benchmarked against one another
  - Constructions use different primitive implementations



## Secure Range Queries

#### The solution

- Analysed security and leakages of the constructions under a common framework
- Analysed theoretically performance of the constructions
- · Implemented and run experiments
  - Implemented 5 OPE / ORE schemes and 5 range query protocols
  - Used same language, framework and primitive implementations
  - Benchmarked primitives execution times
  - Simulated insertion and query stages of all protocols
    - $\cdot\,$  OPE / ORE schemes use our implementation of B+ tree
  - Used different data sizes and distributions, query loads, cache policies and parameters of the constructions



# OPE / ORE schemes

Scheme	
BCLO [Bol+09]	
CLWW [Che+16]	
Lewi-Wu [LW16]	
CLOZ [Cas+18]	
FH-OPE [Ker15]	



## OPE / ORE schemes

Scheme -	Primitive Encryption	comparison	Ciphertext size, or state size	Leakage (In addition to inherent total order)
BCLO [Bol+09]				
CLWW [Che+16]				
Lewi-Wu [LW16]				
CLOZ [Cas+18]				
FH-OPE [Ker15]				



## OPE / ORE schemes

Scheme En	Primitive	usage	Ciphertext size,	Leakage		
	Encryption	Comparison	or state size	(In addition to inherent total order)		
BCLO [Bol+09]	n HG	none	2n	$\approx$ Top half of the bits		
CLWW [Che+16]	n PRF	none	2n	Most-significant differing bit		
Lewi-Wu [LW16]	$\frac{2n/d}{d} \frac{PRP}{(2^d + 1)} PRF$ $\frac{n}{d} 2^d Hash$	n Hash	$\frac{n}{d}\left(\lambda+n+2^{d+1}\right)+\lambda$	Most-significant differing block		
CLOZ [Cas+18]	n PRF n PPH 1 PRP	n² PPH	n · h	Equality pattern of most-significant differing		
FH-OPE [Ker15]	1 Traversal	3 Traversals	3 · n · N	Insertion order		



### Range query protocols

Protocol

B+ tree with ORE

Kerschbaum [KT17]

POPE [Roc+16] warm POPE [Roc+16] cold

Logarithmic-BRC [Dem+16]

ORAM



## Range query protocols

Protocol	I/O requests  Construction Ouery		- Leakage	Communication (result excluded) Construction Ouery	
B+ tree with ORE					
Kerschbaum [KT17]					
POPE [Roc+16] warm POPE [Roc+16] cold					
Logarithmic-BRC [Dem+16]					
ORAM					




## Range query protocols


Protocol	I/O requests		Leakage	Communication (result excluded)	
	Construction	Query	Leakage	Construction	Query
B+ tree with ORE	$\log_B \frac{N}{B}$	$\log_B \frac{N}{B} + \frac{r}{B}$	Same as ORE	1	1
Kerschbaum [KT17]	$\frac{N}{B}$	$\log_2 \frac{N}{B} + \frac{r}{B}$	Total order	log <sub>2</sub> N	log <sub>2</sub> N
POPE [Roc+16] warm POPE [Roc+16] cold	1	$\log_L \frac{N}{B} + \frac{r}{B}$ $\frac{N}{B}$	Partial order Fully hiding	1	log <sub>i.</sub> N N
Logarithmic-BRC [Dem+16]	-	r	Same as SSE	-	log <sub>2</sub> N
ORAM	$\log^2 \frac{N}{B}$	$\log_2 \frac{N}{B} \left( \log_B \frac{N}{B} + \frac{r}{B} \right)$	Fully hiding (access pattern)	$\log^2 \frac{N}{B}$	$\log^2 \frac{N}{B}$



### Simulation results




Construction stage number of I/O requests




Queries stage number of I/O requests



#### Simulation results






Queries stage communication volume (number of messages)



### Simulation results





#### Conclusions

- Strengths, weaknesses and use cases for each construction
- · Ranked by security and performance
- Bugs in algorithms
- Security vulnerabilities in implementations
- Positive performance results for ORAM with B+ tree, and Logarithmic-BRC



# **VLDB: Privacy and Security**

A Comparative Evaluation of Order-Revealing Encryption Schemes and Secure Range-Query Protocols by **Dmytro Bogatov**, George Kollios and Leonid Reyzin [BKR19] (PVLDB 2019)

Dmytro Bogatov dmytro@dbogatov.org Built from 71921593 on June 6, 2020

Boston University

#### References i



Alexandra Boldyreva *et al.* "Order-Preserving Symmetric Encryption". In: *Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2009.* Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009, pp. 224–241.



Florian Kerschbaum. "Frequency-Hiding Order-Preserving Encryption". In: Proceedings of the 22Nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 2015, pp. 656–667.



Nathan Chenette *et al.* "Practical Order-Revealing Encryption with Limited Leakage". In: *Fast Software Encryption*. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2016, pp. 474–493.



Ioannis Demertzis *et al.* "Practical Private Range Search Revisited". In: ACM, 2016, pp. 185–198.



Kevin Lewi and David J. Wu. "Order-Revealing Encryption: New Constructions, Applications, and Lower Bounds". In: ACM, 2016, pp. 1167–1178.



#### References ii



Daniel S. Roche et al. "POPE: Partial Order Preserving Encoding". In: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 2016, pp. 1131–1142.



Florian Kerschbaum and Anselme Tueno. "An Efficiently Searchable Encrypted Data Structure for Range Queries". In: *arXiv preprint arXiv:1709.09314* (2017).



David Cash *et al.* "Parameter-Hiding Order Revealing Encryption". In: *Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2018.* Springer International Publishing, 2018, pp. 181–210.



Dmytro Bogatov, George Kollios, and Leonid Reyzin. "A Comparative Evaluation of Order-Revealing Encryption Schemes and Secure Range-Query Protocols". In: *PVLDB* 12.8 (2019), pp. 933–947.

